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MIGRATION ELASTICITIES, FISCAL FEDERALISM, AND THE 
ABILITY OF STATES TO REDISTRIBUTE INCOME
Seth H. Giertz and Mehmet S. Tosun
This paper develops a simulation model in order to examine the effectiveness of state 
attempts at redistribution under a variety of migration elasticity assumptions. Key 
outputs from the simulation include the impact of tax-induced migration on state 
revenues, excess burden, and fi scal externalities. With modest migration elasticities, 
the costs of state-level redistribution are substantial, but state action may still be 
preferred to a federal policy that is at odds with preferences of a state’s citizens. At 
higher migration elasticities, the costs of state action can be tremendous. Overall 
excess burden is greater, but this is dominated by horizontal fi scal externalities. 
Horizontal fi scal externalities represent a cost to the state pursuing additional 
redistribution, but not a cost at the national level.
Keywords: fi scal federalism, income redistribution, excess burden, deadweight 
loss, fi scal externalities
JEL Codes: H21, H23, H71
I. INTRODUCTION
For several decades, the dominant view among economists was that the ability of state governments to redistribute income is limited, and thus redistribution should 
be left primarily to the federal government. This view was well articulated by Richard 
Musgrave (1971, p. 7): 
“Policies to adjust the distribution of income among individuals must be 
conducted on a nationwide basis … [R]egional measures are self-defeating, 
as the rich will leave and the poor will move to the more egalitarian-minded 
jurisdictions. Progressive income taxation at the upper as well as transfers 
at the lower end of the scale — if substantial in scope — must be uniform 
within the entire area over which there is a high degree of capital and labor 
mobility, which means they have to be a function of the national government” 
(Musgrave, 1971, p.7). 
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Despite this view, state governments continue to use redistributive income taxes (in 
addition to the federal personal income tax). For example, California has a 10.3 per-
cent top state personal income tax rate, which includes a 1 percent surtax on taxable 
incomes exceeding $1 million. Furthermore, California voters are considering raising 
their surtaxes by 3 percentage points for those with taxable income exceeding $1 million 
and by 5 percentage points for those with taxable income exceeding $2 million. While 
Musgrave (1971), Oates (1972), and others suggest that these policies should be left to 
the federal government, more recent research raises the possibility of a role for states 
in redistribution. For example, Gordon and Cullen (forthcoming) note that states may 
differ in their tastes for redistribution. Gordon and Cullen agree that states are better 
off having the federal government adopt their preferred redistribution policy. However, 
if the choice is between state-level policies or a federal policy that deviates from the 
state’s preferred choice, then a role for state-level redistribution may still exist. They 
fi nd that some state redistribution is likely optimal even with high migration elasticities. 
The question becomes even more complicated if, as Gordon and Cullen assume, state 
and federal governments react to each other’s policies.
The effectiveness of proposals such as those being considered in California is unclear. 
Important empirical research both supports Musgrave’s argument and raises questions 
pertaining to the assumptions that are at its foundation. In one case, Feldstein and Wro-
bel (1998) corroborate Musgrave’s argument, fi nding substantial migration elasticities 
and roughly full wage capitalization for redistributive state taxes. They use Current 
Population Data (CPS) for March 1983 and 1989 and fi nd that such taxes are capitalized 
into wage rates, making attempts by states to redistribute income largely ineffective. 
However, Leigh (2008) and Young and Varner (2011) reach different conclusions. Leigh 
(2008) uses a broader range of the CPS data from 1977 to 2002, and does not fi nd clear 
evidence that redistributive taxes affect interstate migration. He fi nds that redistributive 
taxes lead to a more equal distribution of post-tax wages. Young and Varner (2011) also 
report results that are not consistent with  Feldstein and Wrobel’s fi ndings. They examine 
the migration response of top earners using New Jersey’s “millionaire” tax that was 
adopted in 2004 as a policy experiment. They fi nd a very small migration response to 
that tax change and some reduction in income inequality.1
Migration responses to redistributive state policies limit the ability of states to redis-
tribute income in two respects. First, it is the relative elasticities of supply and demand 
that determine the incidence of a tax or a subsidy. Thus, greater migration responses 
imply larger labor supply elasticities, which diminish the effect of redistributive taxation 
on after tax wages. However, another possibility is that wages do not adjust. Instead, 
sectors that are intensive in high-skilled labor (i.e., the factor of production facing the 
surtax) may contract, while those intensive in low-skilled labor (i.e., the subsidized fac-
 1 There are also other studies that show some tax-induced migration response, particularly for high-income 
earners (Bakija and Slemrod, 2004; Kleven et al., 2011; Kleven, Landais, and Saez, 2010), and similarly 
other studies that point to only a limited tax-induced migration response (Conway and Houtenville, 2001; 
Duncombe, Robbins, and Wolf, 2003; Liebig, Puhani, and Sousa-Poza, 2007; Conway and Rork, 2008).
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tor) may expand. This is consistent with the Rybczynski (1955) and Stolper-Samuelson 
(1941) theorems applied to the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model for international 
trade. Using this approach, Gordon and Cullen (forthcoming) develop an optimal tax 
model showing the optimality of state redistributive tax policies, even with federal 
taxation and migration between states. Second, even without wage responses, migra-
tion responses imply fi scal externalities, which can greatly increase the costs to states 
from redistribution. State redistributive policies, by causing high-income taxpayers to 
leave and low-income benefi ciaries to come to the state, both reduce the state’s ability 
to raise revenue and increase its need to provide benefi ts.
An important policy question is to what extent such policies are capable of redistribut-
ing income given the responsiveness of the tax base both within the states and also across 
different states through interstate mobility. We do not resolve that question here. Instead 
we perform simulations showing the implications of a range of migration elasticities on 
the ability of states to redistribute income. In the next section we take a closer look at the 
issue of wage capitalization. In Sections III and IV, we present a simulation model and 
results that show the implications of different migration elasticities for effi ciency and 
fi scal externalities. We construct states with differing tastes for redistribution. We use 
IRS-SOI tax tables as a starting point of our analysis. Redistribution takes the form of 
a tax subsidy or a negative income tax. We use a range of migration elasticities to show 
how they impact the analysis and implications for state versus federal redistribution. 
In general, high elasticities imply large effi ciency consequences from taxation. 
However, large migration elasticities have more modest (but for high surtaxes, still 
substantial) impacts on overall economic effi ciency, but large effects on fi scal exter-
nalities. The larger the fi scal externalities, the more appealing is federal policy, even if 
it deviates from the state’s preferred policy. For example, consider a state that favors 
a 10 percent surtax, which may not be desirable at the federal level. With a migration 
elasticity of 1, state revenues from the surtax fall by 39 percent (to $572 million from 
$931 million under the federal scenario) and the average subsidy falls by 41 percent 
(from $1,707 under the federal scenario to $1,012). Overall excess burden from the 
surtax rises by 16 percent (from $435 million to $506 million). The increase in excess 
burden is small relative to the drop in revenues because of a $289 million fi scal exter-
nality, which equals 81 percent of the drop in own state revenues — and also represents 
gains in state revenues for other states. 
By comparison, a federal surtax of 5 percent looks appealing. While far from the 
state’s ideal choice, revenue from the federal tax (earmarked for the state whose citizens 
contributed the revenues) is not lost to fi scal externalities. By comparison, a 5 percent 
federal surtax scenario raises $466 million for the state or 81 percent of what the 10 
percent state tax would raise with a migration elasticity of 1. The subsidy under the 
federal plan would be $855 or 84 percent of what the 10 percent state tax would raise 
(with a migration elasticity of 1). While the federal numbers are lower than those for 
the state plan (with twice the surtax rate), the federal plan saves the state $359 million, 
which represents the horizontal fi scal externality from the state plan. For states favoring 
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less redistribution and for cases where migration responses are smaller, the advantages 
of federal taxation are smaller.
II. TAX-INDUCED MIGRATION AND WAGE CAPITALIZATION
This section provides a brief overview of the wage capitalization issue before turning 
to the question of fi scal externalities. In a basic partial equilibrium labor market model, 
perfect labor mobility gives us full wage capitalization as shown in Figure 1. (Over 
the long-run, this can be thought of as a perfectly elastic supply curve.) Table 1 shows 
specifi c incidence calculations for different migration elasticities with labor supply and 
labor demand elasticities kept fi xed at plausible estimates from the literature.2 Again, 
we see that full wage capitalization where post-tax wage increases by the full amount 
of the tax occurs when the migration elasticity reaches infi nity. While the main argu-
ments and fi ndings in Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) are more in line with Figure 1 or 
the incidence result shown in the last column of Table 1, the fi ndings in Leigh (2008) 
and Young and Varner (2011) are more in line with the incidence result shown in the 
fi rst column of Table 1. Since migration plays a critical role in determining the exact 
wage capitalization result in this model, we show basic state migration statistics from 
the CPS and the American Community Survey in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. 
 2 For these calculations we are using the standard partial equilibrium tax incidence formula as follows: 
dP / dt = ηD / (ηS – ηD) for a tax paid by consumers, and dP / dt = ηS / (ηS – ηD ) for a tax paid by producers, where ηD is the price elasticity of demand and ηS is the price elasticity of supply. 
Figure 1 
Simple Model of Wage Capitalization
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Table 2 shows that migration fl ows do not necessarily increase with income (and in 
some cases decrease with income) but there is relatively high mobility among the top 
($75,000 and over) income group. The West region that tends to have states with low 
(or no) income tax has a surprisingly low share of in-migrants and high share of out-
migrants for the top income group, whereas the opposite occurs for the Northeast region 
that has more high-income-tax states. Table 3 shows that there is a high variation in 
the share of in-migrants in total state population across states but the average share is 
only slightly greater than 2 percent. Hence it is diffi cult to say exactly how important 
or large migration fl ows are between states. While some states experience particularly 
high levels of interstate migration, average migration share does not seem to be very 
high. At the same time, while there is no clear positive association between income 
groups and migration fl ows, the top income group, as expected, seems to experience 
relatively high migration. This provides good motivation to use not one but a set of 
different migration elasticities in our analysis.
At the same time, and as mentioned in the introduction, wages do not necessarily 
adjust. Hanson and Slaughter (2002) showed that state factor supply shocks (such as 
migration) do not lead to state-specifi c wage adjustments. This is also consistent with 
the approach used by Gordon and Cullen (forthcoming) and the productivity-adjusted 
factor price equalization argument. 
There does not seem to be a consensus in the relevant empirical literature on whether 
or to what extent states are able to redistribute income through income taxation, leav-
ing room for more research on the link between redistributive taxes, migration, and 
the redistributive ability of states. The coexistence of federal and state redistributive 
taxation is another interesting link that we address in this paper.
III. MODEL AND DATA
We develop a simplifi ed model for the United States and then conduct simulations to 
assess the implications of high-income surtaxes under different scenarios. Th e analysis 
relies on aggregated Internal Revenue Service data, which breaks income down by 
statutory marginal tax rates (Table 4). The table excludes income subject to a top tax 
Table 1
Wage Capitalization from Redistributive Taxation
emigration  0.00  0.25  0.75  1.00  2.00  infi nity
ηS  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10
ηD  –0.45 –0.45 –0.45 –0.45 –0.45 –0.45
Employer share  0.18  0.44  0.65  0.71  0.82  0.00
Employee share –0.82 –0.56 –0.35 –0.29 –0.18  0.00
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Table 4
2005 Individual Income and Tax Revenues by Tax Bracket
Statutory 
MTR (%)
Taxable Income 
$Millions
Income at MTR
$Millions
Tax Revenue
$Millions
Tax Revenue at 
MTR $Millions
10 152,960 145,800 14,591 14,580
15 1,183,128 675,310 152,079 101,296
25 1,568,262 286,224 265,214 71,556
28 545,834 46,365 115,129 12,982
33 387,601 84,882 95,205 28,011
35 860,237 485,043 261,691 169,765
Total 4,698,021 903,909
Source: Based on Table 3.4 from IRS (2011)
Table 3
Migration Flows in U.S. Regions, by Income: 2010–2011
Northeast Midwest South West
Total in-migrants (16+ years, thousands) 188 428 789 486
In-migration Shares by Income Groups (%):
Without income  5.32 13.79 10.01 12.76
Under $10,000 or loss 19.15 17.99 24.97 14.81
$10,000–$19,999 13.83 15.42 16.48 17.90
$20,000–$29,999 18.09 12.62 11.66 14.81
$30,000–$39,999 12.77 13.55  9.00 12.14
$40,000–$49,999  4.26  7.71  8.49  6.17
$50,000–$59,999  7.98  4.67  4.82  7.00
$60,000–$74,999  3.19  3.74  4.56  7.61
$75,000+ 15.96 10.98 10.39  6.38
Total out-migrants (16+ years, thousands) 408 369 627 487
Out-migration Shares by Income Groups (%):
Without income 13.24  8.13 13.08  9.03
Under $10,000 or loss 20.34 19.51 17.86 23.61
$10,000–$19,999 15.20 17.07 14.99 18.48
$20,000–$29,999 13.24 13.55 15.95  9.86
$30,000–$39,999 11.03  8.94 12.44 11.50
$40,000–$49,999  9.80  6.50  7.02  6.16
$50,000–$59,999  1.96 10.03  5.42  5.75
$60,000–$74,999  5.88  5.15  4.63  4.72
$75,000+  9.80 10.57  8.93 11.29
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and 2011 Annual Social and Economic Supplement
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rate equal to the capital gains rate and also excludes those fi lers with no income tax 
liability. For our analysis, it is only the 10 percent and 35 percent brackets that are 
important. For 2009, the 10 percent bracket applies to taxable income from zero to as 
high as $16,700 (for joint fi lers). The 35 percent bracket begins at $372,950.3 Table 4 
shows $4.7 trillion in (modifi ed) taxable income and over $900 billion in tax revenue 
for 2009. These numbers are smaller than 2009 totals because they exclude fi lers whose 
top marginal tax rate (MTR) is for income from capital gains.4
These data are used to create hypothetical and stylized states. States are assumed 
to have attributes that are exactly 1/50 of those reported in Table 4. When accounting 
for effects occurring outside the state, the rest of the United States is assumed to have 
attributes that are exactly 49/50 of those reported in Table 4. While the stylized states 
are homogeneous with respect to size, income and income distribution, they may have 
heterogeneous preferences for redistribution. 
In the following section, we construct several scenarios. We examine two states that are 
considering high-income surtaxes on those in the 35 percent federal income tax bracket, 
with the additional revenue redistributed to those in the 10 percent federal income tax 
bracket. We compare and contrast these results to those obtained with a purely federal 
policy. We include three cases: a 3, 5 or 10 percentage point surtax. Next, we examine 
purely state policies. In one case, a state implements a 3 percentage point surtax. In 
the other case, a state implements a 10 percentage point surtax. In both instances, the 
federal and other state governments make no policy changes.
In our model, subsidies to the low-income group are structured similar to the Earned 
Income Tax Credit. Revenue raised from the surtax on the 35 percent federal tax bracket 
is used to lower marginal tax rates for those in the 10 percent tax bracket. Note that the 
per capita value of the subsidy may be infl uenced by migration patterns (in addition to 
other behavioral responses) at both the top and bottom of the income distribution. Out-
migration from the high-income group lowers the pool of revenue used to subsidize the 
low-income group. And, in-migration at the low end of the income distribution results 
in a lower-subsidy rate, since the budget for the program is set by the revenue from the 
surtax. This EITC-based approach seems consistent with recent trends in redistribution 
at both the federal and state levels. The EITC is now the largest cash transfer program in 
the United States that targets low-income groups. Additionally, 25 states plus the District 
of Columbia supplement the federal program with their own state EITCs (Johnson and 
Williams, 2011). 
An alternative possibility is to provide lump-sum grants to the low-income group. 
Such a scheme could impact migration, but would not affect work incentives, except for 
those at the kink point or in the phase-out range. Aside from those at the kink, the low-
income subsidy would not have effi ciency implications (emanating from the low-income 
group). By contrast, the EITC-based approach has positive effi ciency implications for 
the economy by reducing the tax wedge for the low-income group. This partially offsets 
the welfare loss from the high-income surtax.
 3 See IRS (2011), Table 3.4. 
 4 Total tax revenue includes some revenue from capital gains taxes, so long as capital gains were taxed at 
a lower rate than the fi lers’ top rate on ordinary income. 
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A. Migration and Fiscal Externalities
Suppose the political process within each state effectively aggregates citizens’ prefer-
ences (which are heterogeneously distributed across states) into a social welfare function 
and implements policies accordingly. Then, the state government will transfer income 
from the top to bottom bracket until the marginal cost including excess burden of the 
last dollar transferred exactly equals the marginal social benefi t, as calculated via the 
social welfare function.5 The surtax imposes costs to society as measured by changes 
in excess burden. These costs are weighed against the benefi ts citizens receive from 
redistributing income and, because the low-income subsidy here is effi ciency enhanc-
ing, effi ciency gains from the low-income subsidy.
Maintaining these assumptions, one would expect the state to optimize the social 
welfare of its citizens, without regard to the welfare of those in other states.6 However, 
the welfare implications for both the own state and other states will depend, partly, 
on migration responses to the tax changes. These responses include people physically 
moving as well as shifting income across state boarders. These migration responses 
create fi scal externalities, and thus states maximizing their own social welfare will not 
be optimizing from a national perspective.
Absent externalities, Feldstein (1995, 1999) shows that the marginal excess burden 
associated with another dollar of income leaving the tax base in response to a tax rate 
increase is refl ected by the marginal tax rate. For example, if one’s marginal tax rate 
goes from 35 to 38 percent, the loss to society associated with the last dollar removed 
from the tax base is 38 cents (i.e., the price the government would have charged had 
it been reported as taxable income).7 However, with migration, some taxable income 
is not leaving all tax bases, but is shifted from one tax base to another. In this case, it 
is the difference between the marginal tax rates in the two tax bases that affects the 
marginal cost of shifting a dollar of taxable income. This income shifting represents 
a horizontal fi scal externality that benefi ts other states, partially offsetting the welfare 
loss to the taxing state. For more on the implications of fi scal externalities, see Saez, 
Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) and Chetty (2009). 
It is these fi scal externalities that underlie the standard arguments made by Musgrave 
(1971), Oates (1972), and others that redistribution should be primarily left to the fed-
eral government. Interstate migration is not an issue with federal policy that applies 
to all states, thus horizontal fi scal externalities are no longer present. However, there 
are a couple of important caveats to this argument. Johnson (1988) shows that there is 
 5 An additional assumption is that citizens are only concerned with the redistribution between these two 
brackets or that there are other constraints preventing other types of redistribution. 
 6 While this model of the political system is highly unrealistic, with respect to both the ability to aggregate 
preferences and with the motivation of politicians, it is not central to the analysis in the following section. 
Excess burden and revenue calculations do not depend on the political process used to reach these policies. 
However, an analogy to a social welfare function is necessary, if one is to assess whether the benefi ts of 
the policy outweigh the costs.
 7 Note that this is different from the marginal excess burden associated with another dollar of tax revenue 
and is also different from the marginal excess burden from increasing the tax rate, which depends the 
elasticity of taxable income — i.e., how much income leaves the tax base.
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also a negative fi scal externality imposed on other states related to changes in federal 
tax revenues. Own state behavioral responses, other than migration, to a surtax reduce 
federal revenues. This lowers federal expenditures in the own state (which does not 
represent an externality), but also reduces federal expenditures (assuming that federal tax 
rates and borrowing are held constant) in other states. This represents a negative fi scal 
externality for the other states and acts to offset the positive fi scal externality. Johnson 
goes on to show that relative sizes of the labor supply — his work predates the taxable 
income elasticity literature — and migration elasticities are critical in determining the 
roles that the federal and state governments should play in redistribution. With a purely 
federal policy, the horizontal fi scal externality is avoided; however, behavioral responses 
to the federal policy generate negative vertical fi scal externalities. 
Gordon and Cullen (forthcoming) also point to a potential role for states in redistri-
bution. They note that states may have different preferences for redistribution — an 
assumption we have adopted here. With heterogeneous tastes across states, a federal 
policy avoids horizontal fi scal externalities, but the cost of this policy is that most states 
do not have their preferred policy with respect to redistribution. Gordon and Cullen 
develop a sophisticated model that allows for both state and federal roles in redistribution 
policy. As with Johnson, the size of the migration elasticity is central in determining 
the balance between federal and state policies. 
In what follows, we construct states with differing tastes for redistribution. We esti-
mate the excess burden from such policies and the value of the low-income subsidies. 
In doing so, we also estimate the implications the policies would have for tax revenues 
and migration. We produce estimates under an array of migration elasticities, including 
cases where the policy is carried out at the federal level and migration is not relevant. 
Our analysis highlights the tradeoffs between effi ciency and equity and illustrates the 
role of positive fi scal externalities raised by Musgrave, Oates, and others, as well as 
the offsetting vertical fi scal externalities raised by Johnson. By comparing federal and 
state policies, we also show the tradeoffs between the level of excess burden and the 
desired policies towards redistribution that are raised by Gordon and Cullen.
B. Model Setup
As presented in Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012), and building on the work of Feld-
stein (1999), the change in revenues resulting from an increase in tax rates on the top 
tax bracket is broken down into mechanical and behavioral changes, such that
(1) Δ = ⋅Δ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅
−
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢ ⋅ −
⎞
⎠⎟
⎤
⎦⎥
⎛
⎝⎜N EMTR z z ETI
z
z z
EMTR
EMTR
Revenue ( – ) 1
1
.8
 8 Tax rate changes at lower brackets can be analyzed analogously by focusing on the group of taxpayers 
facing the marginal rates in the bracket in which the rate is changing. However, with a tax rate increase 
there will also be a gain (and with a decrease in the tax rate there will be a loss) in revenues from those 
with incomes in the higher brackets.
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Here, z is average taxable income for those in top rate bracket, and z–  is the level of 
taxable income where the top tax rate kicks in, and N is the number of taxpayers in the 
top bracket. EMTR is the effective marginal tax rate. The EMTR — that is, the share 
of an additional dollar of income that is paid to the government — is often somewhat 
different from the statutory MTR because the EMTR takes into account phase-ins, 
phase-outs, and other interactions with the IRS code. These other factors affect the 
actual share of income that the government receives. ETI is the elasticity of taxable 
income. The fi rst part of (1), N · ∆EMTR · (z – z– ) equals the mechanical response, or 
the change in tax revenue assuming no behavioral responses (migration or otherwise). 
Thus, if ETI equals 0, there is no behavioral response and tax revenue increases linearly 
with the tax rate. The second term (i.e., the term inside the brackets) is the share of the 
mechanical response that is offset by changes in behavior. If this share is greater than 
1, it implies a Laffer response — that is, an increase in the MTR results in a decrease 
in tax revenue. Note that the Laffer (or revenue maximizing) rate equals 1/{1 + [z/(z – 
z– )]ETI}. And, that rearranging (1) to highlight revenue changes from the mechanical 
and behavioral responses yields 
(2) Δ = ⋅Δ ⋅ − − ⋅Δ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
−
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟N EMTR z z ETI EMTR N z
EMTR
EMTR
Revenue ( )
1
,
where the fi rst term is the mechanical response and the second term is the behavioral 
response, which equals the marginal excess burden.
Finally, the behavioral response is also exactly equal to the change in excess burden 
resulting from the tax rate change.9 However, this is only true so long as this is a holistic 
measure of tax revenue — i.e., it includes revenue that is lost to one tax base, but is shifted 
into another tax base. In other words, focusing on a single tax base may provide a poor 
estimate of excess burden if fi scal externalities are present. If a tax induces migration, 
and thus affects taxable income in other states, then (2) would need to be analyzed for 
each state (even if policy remains unchanged in these other states).10
The behavioral response from (2) affects overall revenues from the federal, payroll, 
and state tax bases combined because the bases overlap. One can impute average income, 
z ′, at the new tax rates where
(3) ′ = ⋅ − ⋅
−
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟z z ETI
dt
MTR
1
1
.
Next the overall change in revenues can be disaggregated into changes in revenues 
for each of the taxes with overlapping tax bases. Thus, the change in state income tax 
 9 For more detail on how these responses are calculated, see Saez (2004) or Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 
(2012).
10 In terms of notation, this would mean summation signs to both sides of (2) and adding subscripts to denote 
each state.
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revenue from raising the rate on the top income tax bracket, and when accounting for 
behavioral responses, can be expressed such that
(4) ( )Δ = ⋅ Δ ⋅ ′ − − ⋅ − ′N EMTR z z EMTR z zStateRevenue ( ) ( )state .
As discussed earlier in this section, Table 4 provides the information on taxable 
income and taxpayers by federal tax bracket, which will be used with the formulas just 
presented. To carry out the exercise, information or assumptions are needed for EMTRs 
and for the ETI. We use EMTRs on labor income estimated by the Congressional Bud-
get Offi ce (CBO, 2005).11 According to CBO and as presented in Table 5, when all the 
intricacies of the tax code are taken into account, EMTRs for the individual income 
tax range from –1.6 percent for those not paying income tax but sometimes receiving 
refundable tax credits (such as the earned income tax credit), to almost 35 percent for 
the top two statutory tax brackets. The remaining columns of Table 5 show what happens 
when payroll and state taxes are also included. While the individual income tax hits 
upper income groups the hardest (at the margin), federal payroll taxes (used to fi nance 
Social Security and Medicare) hit lower income groups the hardest. EMTRs for state 
taxes are greatest for middle-income groups. When these three taxes are combined, 
EMTRs range from just over 30 percent for the 10 percent bracket to over 41 percent 
for the 33 percent bracket.12
11 See CBO (2005) for an analysis of EMTRs on labor income. CBO’s analysis is after the Jobs and Growth 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003, which approximates the current U.S. Federal income 
tax system. 
12 Note that EMTRs and statutory MTRs can be very different from average tax rates, which simply represent 
total taxes divided by total income. For an analysis of average income tax rates across income groups and 
over time, see Piketty and Saez (2007).
Table 5
Eff ective Marginal Tax Rates
Statutory Tax 
Rate Bracket
Federal 
EMTR
Payroll 
EMTR
State 
EMTR
Total 
EMTR
0 –1.6 13.5 0.9 12.7
10 14.8 12.8 2.6 30.2
15 16.3 12.5 6.1 34.9
25 26.3 10.0 3.7 40.0
28 30.1 5.3 3.7 39.0
33 34.7 3.1 3.5 41.3
35 34.7 2.5 3.4 40.7
Source: Congressional Budget Offi ce (2005)
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The fi nal piece of information is the ETI. At the national level, the empirical literature 
on the ETI suggests a wide range of plausible estimates, and considerable disagreement 
surrounds the size of this parameter (Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012). One general 
fi nding from the literature, however, is that responsiveness tends to be larger for high-
income taxpayers. Excluding migration effects, we assume a base ETI for the top 
income group of 0.4. For the low-income group, we assume a base ETI of 0.25. These 
are used to estimate the effects of federal tax changes, where migration is not an issue. 
To highlight the effect of migration elasticities on the analysis, we perform simulations 
with a migration ETI of 0.3 and again with a migration ETI of 1 (as well as the federal 
case, where we assume the migration ETI is 0). The overall ETI is assumed to equal 
the base ETI plus the migration ETI.13
Taxes may affect migration and other taxable income responses in different ways. It 
is usually argued that the marginal tax rate is the central motivating factor underlying 
the ETI. However, it may be that average tax rates are more important when considering 
migration. For example, if one is considering where to locate and cannot easily shift 
dollars across state lines at the margin, then the marginal tax rate may be a second order 
consideration. An increase in one’s marginal tax rate, coupled with a lowering of rates 
in other brackets, could have the net effect of increasing one’s after-tax income (absent 
behavioral responses). Thus, people may base location more on average tax rates, but the 
marginal tax rate would infl uence behavior once relocated. While we fi nd this argument 
appealing, for the sake of simplicity, we continue to focus on the marginal tax rate as 
the driving force behind tax responses, including migration.
IV. RESULTS
Results from the exercise described in the previous section and presented here show 
that migration responses have relatively modest effects on the overall excess burden, 
but can introduce substantial fi scal externalities. Employment in a different state may 
be a close substitute to employment in one’s own state, and the closer the substitutes, 
the lower the overall effi ciency loss. This is analogous to Harberger’s (1964) com-
prehensive excess burden formula. Harberger shows that for a positive tax rate (and a 
given overall elasticity), substitutes to the taxed good lessen the overall excess burden, 
while complements exacerbate the effect. The core ETI (i.e., excluding migration 
responses), on the other hand, is central to determining the overall excess burden from 
the surtaxes. Migration responses, by imparting fi scal externalities, can create huge 
differences between the overall (national) excess burden from a surtax and the burden 
borne by the state enacting the policy. The migration responses also greatly lower the 
states’ ability to provide subsidies. For the 3 percent surtax, migration responses lower 
the average subsidy by 8 percent with a migration elasticity of 0.3, and by 20 percent 
13 Recall from Section II that when examining wage capitalization, we assumed a labor supply elasticity of 
0.1. The ETI is a broader measure of tax responsiveness and traditional labor supply responses are just 
one component of the ETI.
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with a migration elasticity of 1. For the 10 percent surtax migration responses lower 
the average subsidy by 19 percent with a migration elasticity of 0.3, and by 41 percent 
with a migration elasticity of 1. 
A. Federal Case
Tables 6 and 7 depict results from the federal redistributive tax plans for three possible 
surtax rates. To facilitate comparisons to state policies, we assume here that, instead 
of a federal surtax, all states impose the exact same surtax and redistribution scheme. 
Thus, revenues from the surtax are labeled state revenues. This approach is identical 
to a federal policy in which the revenues from the surtax are given back to the states or 
earmarked for redistribution. Because the policy applies to all states, for a given plan, 
the surtax and low-income subsidy is identical for each state.
The numbers in Tables 6 and 7 are all driven by the assumption of an ETI of 0.4 
(with no migration) for the top federal income tax bracket and an ETI of 0.25 for the 
low-income group. While these are reasonable assumptions, there is no consensus in 
the literature. Credible estimates range from 0 to 1 — and some studies report estimates 
in excess of 1 for very high-income groups. Where the ETI lies within this wide range 
of estimates has tremendous consequences for the effi ciency and revenue implications 
from changes to tax rates. In fact, in examining the major components of the “Bush 
tax cuts,” Giertz (2009) uses a range of ETI estimates from the literature to show how 
allowing the individual income tax rate cuts to expire might affect economic effi ciency 
and tax revenues. Giertz fi nds the excess burden per additional dollar of tax revenue 
from the increase in federal income tax rates to range from $0.19 at an ETI of 0.2 to 
$1.72 at an ETI of 0.8 — i.e., an ETI of 0.8 implies nine times the deadweight loss (per 
dollar of additional federal revenue) than does an ETI of 0.2!14 15 Giertz estimates that 
an ETI of 0.8 implies a total revenue offset of 63.3 percent versus 15.8 percent at an 
ETI of 0.2 (both compared to the potential gain in federal revenues with no behavioral 
responses). Here we do not vary the core elasticities, but examine the implications of 
assuming different migration elasticities.
At a 5 percent rate, our prototypical state subsidizes the low-income group by an 
average of $839. The per-taxpayer cost for the high-income group is $29,523. Each 
state raises an additional $466 million from the high-income surtax. The mechanical 
change in tax revenue, i.e., had there been no behavioral responses, is $485 million. 
Additionally, behavioral responses lower federal income and payroll tax receipts by a 
total of $189 million (per state). Thus, the excess burden from this tax is $208 million 
14 For comparison, Feldstein (1999) uses a microsimulation model to assess the implications of a 10 percent 
increase in marginal tax rates. He concludes that, assuming an ETI of 1.04, behavioral responses would 
erase over two-thirds of the mechanical gain in tax revenues and that the marginal excess burden would 
be over $2 per every additional dollar of revenue. In a more recent paper, Feldstein (2008) assumes an 
ETI of 0.4. Here he reports a marginal excess burden of $0.76 per additional dollar of revenue raised.
15 At an ETI of 0, this measure equals 0 (i.e., changes to tax rates have no effi ciency implications) and once 
the revenue-maximizing (or Laffer) tax rate is reached, this measure equals infi nity.
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per state. Recall from the previous section that the excess burden equals the mechanical 
change in revenues minus the actual change. The excess burden per dollar of additional 
revenue is 90 cents, meaning that for each additional dollar of tax revenue, society loses 
an additional 90 cents. 
However, a state may discount reductions in federal tax revenues that are a byproduct 
of the tax, since most of this loss will be felt in other states (98 percent of the loss if 
federal spending is proportional to state population). Thus, from the state’s perspective, 
the loss is 53 cents per additional dollar in state revenue. The remaining 37 cents per 
dollar is a vertical externality, whose costs are primarily borne by other states. Because 
this is a federal policy (or all states are adopting the same policy), each state’s loss in 
federal spending would equal its loss in federal tax liabilities. Thus, an optimally behav-
ing state would consider the full cost of the federal policy.
Results from a lower federal surtax (3 percent) and a higher federal surtax (10 per-
cent) are also presented in Table 6. When lowering the federal surtax to 3 percent, the 
low-income subsidy changes proportionally, falling from $839 per taxpayer to $513. 
Raising the surtax to 10 percent raises the low-income subsidy to $1,707, or double 
the 5 percent scenario. Likewise, changes to mechanical revenue and state income tax 
revenue are also proportional to the tax change. However, total revenue from all sources 
rises at a less than proportional rate. And, as the surtax rate rise, the marginal excess 
burden increases at a faster rate than the surtax. For example, while the marginal excess 
burden is $208 million (per state) at the 5 percent rate, the same measure is $123 million 
with a 3 percent surtax and $435 million with a 10 percent surtax. 
Table 6 only reports excess burden and revenue changes for the top tax bracket. 
This highlights the effect of the surtax, without regard to the structure of the subsidy. 
As discussed in the previous section, the subsidy is structured so as to be effi ciency 
improving, although subsidies could be constructed in ways that detract further from 
effi ciency. Table 7 adds the effect of the behavioral changes occurring within the low-
income group. The ETI (excluding migration responses) is assumed to equal 0.25 for 
this group. In terms of state income tax revenue, behavioral responses allow states to 
recoup more than 5 percent of the programs costs.16 Thus, for the 5 percent surtax, the 
total effect on state income tax revenues is an increase of $491 million, with $466 mil-
lion from the surtax and $24 million from behavioral responses among the low-income 
group.17 With respect to federal revenues, responses from the low-income group recoup 
between $5 million (4.3 percent of the loss from the top bracket) and $15 million dol-
lars (3.8 percent of the loss from the top bracket). Including the effi ciency gains from 
the low-income group substantially lowers the overall excess burden from the surtax. 
For the 3 percent surtax, responses from the low-income group recoup $20 million in 
excess burden (per state), or 16.1 percent of the measure for the surtax alone. For the 
10 percent surtax, reducing the distortion between taxable and non-taxable activities 
16 For purposes of calculation, revenues from the low-income group are based on taxes paid prior to (as 
opposed to net of) the subsidy.
17 In this and other instances, numbers may not add up exactly due to rounding.
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for the low-income group lowers overall excess burden by $61 million (per state), or 
14.1 percent of the measure for the surtax alone.
B. State Versus Federal Redistribution
We now turn our attention to redistribution at the state level, assuming that the fed-
eral government and other states do not amend their policies in response to the state’s 
actions. We consider two states. One state favors the 10 percent federal surtax; another 
favors the 3 percent surtax. We compare the implications from a state acting alone to 
its preferred policy carried out at the federal level, as well as other federal alternatives.
In each case, the state is better off if its preferred policy is carried out at the federal 
level, and the state policy is more costly and less effective as the migration elasticity 
increases. Table 8 reports that, with a migration elasticity of 0.3, a state surtax of 3 
percent yields an average low-income subsidy of $472 or 92 percent of the $513 subsidy 
under the identical federal plan. A migration elasticity of 1 lowers the subsidy further 
to $416, 81 percent of the value under the federal plan. State income tax revenues from 
the 3 percent surtax fall from $280 million under the federal plan to $258 million with 
the state plan and a migration elasticity of 0.3. With a migration elasticity of 1, state 
income tax revenue increases decline further, to $228 million. These revenue losses, 
compared to the federal baseline scenario, are largely offset by revenue gains in other 
states.18 Thus, within state behavioral responses lower taxable income, reducing revenue 
gains from the surtax. Migration responses shift revenues from the own state to other 
states. From the state’s perspective, both responses have the same consequences, but 
the consequences are very different from a national perspective; hence, the horizontal 
fi scal externality.
What are the implications from a federal policy that deviates from the state’s most 
preferred choice? The federal policy eliminates fi scal externalities and allows for a 
larger subsidy for any given surtax. However, the state’s citizens prefer different level 
of redistribution than the federal government imposes. Compare the state 3 percent 
surtax results from Table 8 to the 5 and 10 percent federal surtax results from Tables 
6.19 While the state prefers the 3 percent federal surtax, the federal 5 percent surtax 
may be preferred to a 3 percent surtax imposed by the state. The moderate surtax state 
would pay low-income taxpayers a $855 dollar average subsidy under the 5 percent 
federal surtax versus $472 under the 3 percent state surtax and a 0.3 migration elasticity. 
Revenues (per state) raised from the federal tax would equal $466 million versus $258 
million with the lower state tax (and a 0.3 migration elasticity). However, with the state 
policy, the state would also lose $21 million from horizontal fi scal externalities. With a 
migration elasticity of one, the horizontal fi scal externalities rise to $48 million and the 
18 This assumes that the taxing state is small relative to the nation and that states are homogeneous in other 
respects. 
19 Tables 7 and 9 present analogous results accounting for low-income behavioral responses. Here the focus 
is on the high-income group — although responses by the low-income group do affect the average subsidy.
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average subsidy falls to $416 (for the 3 percent state surtax). The higher the migration 
elasticity, the better the federal policy looks to the state — even if the federal policy is 
not the state’s most preferred option. 
For a state favoring a higher surtax, the negative effects of state action increase sub-
stantially. With a migration elasticity of 0.3, revenue from the 10 percent state surtax 
drops from $931 million (under the federal scenario) to $744 million. The low-income 
subsidy falls from an average of $1,707 to $1,363. With a migration elasticity of one, 
revenues from the surtax fall to $572 million and the average subsidy falls to $1,012. 
A federal surtax of 5 percent looks appealing by comparison. While it is far from the 
state’s ideal choice, revenue from the tax is not lost to fi scal externalities. The 5 percent 
federal scenario raises $466 million for the state or 81 percent of what the 10 percent 
state tax would raise with a migration elasticity of 1. The subsidy under the federal 
plan would be $855 or 84 percent of what the 10 percent state tax would raise (with a 
migration elasticity of 1). While the federal numbers are lower than those for the state 
plan (with twice the surtax rate), the federal plan saves the state $359 million — includ-
ing $289 million, which represents the horizontal fi scal externality or the revenue that 
would have been recouped by other states.
Like Table 6, Table 8 only reports the revenue and effi ciency implications due to the 
characteristics and behavior of those in the top tax bracket. Table 9 reports the overall 
results from the state plans, after taking into account the behavioral changes for the 
low-income group. Because the subsidy is structured to enhance effi ciency for the low-
income group, their responses partially offset revenue and effi ciency losses from the 
high-income group. Again, these revenue gains from the low-income are pre-subsidy (as 
opposed to net-of-subsidy). For the 10 percent state surtax and with a migration elasticity 
of 0.3, responses from the lower-income group yield an additional $60 million in state 
revenue, offsetting 27 percent of state revenue losses due to behavioral responses. With 
a migration elasticity of 1, the revenue gain is $55 million or 14 percent of the revenue 
losses from behavioral responses by those in the high-income group.
C. Tax Migration and Fiscal Externalities
The total excess burden from the surtax is a function of the core ETI (i.e., exclud-
ing migration), migration responses, and the size of the surtax. Migration elasticities 
increase the overall excess burden of a tax, but often have a much larger effect on fi s-
cal externalities. Recall that a core ETI of 0.4 for the high-income group is assumed 
throughout. With the federal surtax, behavioral responses yield an excess burden but no 
fi scal externalities. Moving to a migration elasticity of 0.3, the overall excess burden 
rises slightly from $123 million to $124 million. However, the cost to the state is 18 
percent larger due to the $21 million horizontal externality.20 Additionally, federal payroll 
and income tax revenues are lower by $112 million. This includes revenue losses from 
20 The story is somewhat more complex, as the state also loses economic activity and tax revenue as a result 
of out-migration. However, it also ends up with fewer citizens to provide with public benefi ts.
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behavioral responses and migration from those initially residing in the state, plus gains 
in federal revenues in other states. The drop in federal revenues represents a negative 
vertical fi scal externality. Because some of this lost federal revenue would benefi t the 
taxing state, this effect adds to the state’s cost from the surtax. However, the state will 
heavily discount these costs in making decisions, since most of this burden will be 
borne by those in other states. 
Imposing a migration elasticity of 1 has a larger effect on overall excess burden, but 
dramatically increases the horizontal fi scal externalities. With the 3 percent surtax, the 
horizontal fi scal externality (i.e., state income tax revenue shifted to other states) rises 
from $21 million to $48 million. For the 10 percent surtax, horizontal fi scal external-
ity rises from $151 to $289 million. Vertical externalities, from reductions in federal 
revenues, are driven by the core ETI and are not impacted by migration responses. As 
noted earlier, horizontal fi scal externalities are analogous to substitute goods in Har-
berger’s (1964) comprehensive excess burden formula. With respect to consumption, 
a reduction in consumption of a good whose tax is raised imparts smaller effi ciency 
losses if that reduction is accompanied by increased consumption of a close substitute. 
Likewise, a reduction in economic activity in a state imposing a surtax imparts smaller 
effi ciency losses if economic activity is shifted to a state that is a close substitute.21 
V. CONCLUSION
Since at least Musgrave (1971) and Oates (1972), it has been argued that tax-induced 
migration severely hinders state attempts at redistribution, and this function of govern-
ment should thus be administered at the federal level. Nevertheless, states continue to 
engage in redistribution. Furthermore, results from recent research on the relationship 
between taxes and migration are mixed, with some studies suggesting that tax-induced 
migration may be fairly small. Additionally, even if state-level redistribution is less 
effective than federal action, a role for state governments may remain if tastes for 
redistribution vary substantially across states. 
This paper develops a simulation model that is used to examine the effectiveness 
of state attempts at redistribution under a variety of migration elasticity assumptions. 
Key outputs from the simulation include the impact of tax-induced migration on state 
revenues, excess burden, and fi scal externalities. With modest migration elasticities, the 
costs of state-level redistribution are substantial, but state action may still be preferred 
to a federal policy that is at odds with preferences of a state’s citizens. At higher migra-
tion elasticities, the costs of state action can be tremendous. Overall excess burden is 
greater, but this is dominated by horizontal fi scal externalities. Horizontal fi scal exter-
21 The per dollar marginal excess burden equals the difference in marginal tax rates between the two states. 
By contrast, if activity is shifted to the untaxed black market, the marginal cost per dollar shifted would 
equal the marginal tax rate in the own state. In this case, economic activity is shifted outside all tax bases. 
While output may not be affected, it is assumed that the cost of shifting an additional dollar of economic 
activity to the black market is associated with a cost equal to the marginal tax rate. Otherwise, theory 
suggests that the activity would have been underground to begin with. Costs include expected penalties 
from law enforcement as well as any added costs of doing business.
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nalities represent a cost to the state pursuing additional redistribution, but not a cost at 
the national level. For example, with a migration elasticity of 0.3, a 3 percent surtax 
increases overall excess burden by just 1 percent (compared to a case where the federal 
government implements the identical policy). However, because of horizontal fi scal 
externalities, the welfare loss to the state imposing the surtax increases by 18 percent. 
For higher surtaxes and higher migration elasticities, these effects are magnifi ed. With 
a 10 percent surtax, overall excess burden rises by 8 percent (again compared to identi-
cal federal policy) and the burden borne by the state imposing the surtax rises by 43 
percent. With a migration elasticity of 1, these numbers roughly double.
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